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ABSTRACT 
 
Radioactive wastes are confined in 49 underground storage 
tanks at the Savannah River Site.  The tanks are examined by 
ultrasonic (UT) methods for thinning, pitting, and stress 
corrosion cracking in order to assess fitness-for-service.  
During an inspection in 2002, ten cracks were identified on one 
of the tanks.  Given the location of the cracks (i.e., adjacent to 
welds, weld attachments, and weld repairs), fabrication details 
(e.g., this tank was not stress-relieved), and the service history 
the degradation mechanism was stress corrosion cracking. 
Crack instability calculations utilizing API-579 guidance were 
performed to show that the combination of expected future 
service condition hydrostatic and weld residual stresses do not 
drive any of the identified cracks to instability. 
 
The cracks were re-inspected in 2007 to determine if crack 
growth had occurred.  During this re-examination, one 
indication that was initially reported as a “possible 
perpendicular crack <25% through wall” in 2002, was clearly 
shown not to be a crack.  Additionally, examination of a new 
area immediately adjacent to other cracks along a vertical weld 
revealed three new cracks.  It is not known when these new 
cracks formed as they could very well have been present in 
2002 as well.  Therefore, a total of twelve cracks were 
evaluated during the re-examination. 
 
Comparison of the crack lengths measured in 2002 and 
2007 revealed that crack growth had occurred in four of the 
nine previously measured cracks.  The crack length extension 
ranged from 0.25 to 1.8 inches.  However, in all cases the 
cracks still remained within the residual stress zone (i.e., within 
two to three inches of the weld).  The impact of the cracks that 
grew on the future service of Tank 15 was re-assessed.  API-
579 crack instability calculations were again performed, based 
on expected future service conditions and trended crack growth 
rates for the future tank service cycle.  The analysis showed 
that the combined hydrostatic and weld residual stresses do not 
drive the identified cracks to instability.  
 
This tank expected to be decommissioned in the near 
future. However, if these plans are delayed, it was 
recommended that a third examination of selected cracks in the 
tank be performed in 2014. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
High level radioactive waste is stored in large underground 
carbon steel tanks (approximately 1,000,000 gallons each) at 
the SRS (see Figure 1).  The primary tank is contained within a 
secondary tank that is separated by a 30 inch wide annulus.  
The secondary tank serves as a liner for a concrete vault.  The 
tanks have been in service for between 25 to 50 years. 
 
The wastes generated at SRS are typically by-products of 
plutonium and uranium recovery processes.  The wastes are 
present in three forms: 
 
1. Supernate – an alkaline sodium salt solution. 
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2. Sludge – a gel containing insoluble metal oxides that settle 
to the tank bottom with some trapped supernate. 
3. Salt Cake – salt crystals formed by evaporation of water 
from the supernate. 
 
The primary species of the salt solution are nitrate, nitrite, 
hydroxide and aluminate.  In addition, the tank interior walls 
are exposed to a potentially humid environment above the 
wastes. 
 
Figure 1.  Cut-away drawing of SRS high-level radioactive 
waste tank. 
 
The oldest waste tanks were not stress-relieved following 
welding.  Therefore, the carbon steel in these tanks is 
susceptible to nitrate stress corrosion cracking in the region 
near welds [1].  In the past, SRS has relied upon laboratory 
testing, visual examinations, and residual stress modeling to 
characterize these flaws.  Recently however, magnetic wall 
crawlers have been developed to transport ultrasonic (UT) 
inspection equipment into the annulus region so that crack 
sizing and characterization may be performed.  In 2002, UT 
was utilized to characterize ten cracks in one of the tanks [2].  
The cracks were re-inspected in 2007 to determine if crack 
growth had occurred.  This paper will compare the previous 
data on stress corrosion cracks with the new information 
gathered from the 2007 UT inspection in an effort to verify the 
current understanding of nitrate stress corrosion cracking in 
carbon steel tanks.  Additionally the potential impact of each 
crack on the structural stability of the tank structure was 
evaluated. 
 
NON-DESTRUCTIVE EXAMINATION OF CRACKS 
 
UT inspection was performed with the FORCE 
Technology, P-scan, PS4-Lite, automated system.  This system 
is capable of operating 2 angle beam and 1 thickness mapping 
transducer or 4 angle beam probes simultaneously.  The PS4-
Lite also controls the wall crawler that carries the probes across 
the tank surface.  The crawler was also built by FORCE 
Technology and attaches to the steel tank wall by strong 
permanent magnetic wheels (see Figure 2).  The crawler is 
capable of being installed through a five inch carbon steel riser.  
The crawler is also outfitted with a remote control pan and tilt 
camera system with auxiliary lighting.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.  Wall crawler utilized for UT inspections. 
 
Crack detection was performed utilizing single element, 45 
degree shear wave transducers (Krautkramer MWB-45-4E) 
operating at 4 MHz.  The system was operated to detect stress 
corrosion cracking (SCC) oriented parallel and/or 
perpendicular to welds and vertically oriented SCC in the base 
metal.  Crack lengths were reported to the point(s) where the 
indication was no longer discernable from the noise (See 
Figure 3).  If a crack was branched, the crack tips that resulted 
in the maximum length in the vertical or horizontal orientation 
were utilized.  No attempt was made to estimate the length 
along an arc.  Crack depths were determined utilizing planar 
flaw sizing techniques.  For indications less than 100% 
through-wall, the Absolute Arrival Time Technique (AATT) 
was used to measure the remaining metal ligament.  AATT is a 
planar flaw sizing technique to provide a direct reading of 
depth the crack tip.  The UT equipment was qualified to detect 
the crack depth within 0.1 inches for a crack between 0.5 and 6 
inches long.  The personnel performing the UT inspections 
were certified Level II or Level III in the method utilized. 
 
Cracks were also detected utilizing a technique termed 
through-wall bleed-out.  The technique is a field implemented 
variation of a liquid penetrant surface inspection technique.  It 
was observed that water used as the UT couplant would 
penetrate via capillary action the surface cracks.  Due to the 
elevated temperature of the tanks wall, the wetted surface 
would dry after a few minutes.  If a crack was open to the 
exterior surface, the water drawn into the crack would bleed 
out providing a high contrast image of an open crack (see 
Figure 4).  Video cameras were utilized to view these 
indications and make approximate estimates of the crack length 
as the crawler was being drawn along the tank wall. 
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Figure 3.  UT scan of stress corrosion crack. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.  Example of through-wall bleedout. 
 
Although the techniques and the transducers used to size 
the crack in 2002 and 2007 were the same, there was a 
significant mechanical improvement to the fixtures that held the 
probes.  This improvement allowed for better contact between 
the probe and the tank wall surface and a closer approach to the 
seam weld bead.  As a result, better scan resolution, and hence 
more accurate sizing, was achieved.     
 
To determine whether growth had occurred, all available 
scan data was utilized to look for reference points on the 
interior surface of the tank (e.g., weld beads).  Typically there 
were at least two sets of data for each indication from each 
examination period.  Crack extension was then determined by a 
comparison between the distance between this reference point 
and the tip of the crack in 2002 and 2007.   
DISCUSSION 
Crack Analysis 
 
The ten cracks that were identified during a UT inspection 
performed in 2002 were re-examined in 2007.  During this re-
examination, one indication that was initially reported as a 
“possible perpendicular crack <25% through wall”, was clearly 
shown not to be a crack.  Additionally, examination of a new 
area immediately adjacent to other cracks along a vertical weld 
revealed three new cracks.  It is not known when these new 
cracks formed as they could very well have been present in 
2002 as well.  Therefore, a total of twelve cracks were 
evaluated during the re-examination in 2007. 
 
Of these twelve cracks, nine were located in the vapor 
space above a layer of solids, including the three new cracks.  
Comparison of the crack lengths measured in 2002 and 2007 
revealed that crack growth had occurred in four of the six 
previously measured vapor space cracks.  None of the three 
cracks beneath the sludge showed evidence of growth. 
 
An example of a crack that grew is shown in Figure 5.  The 
crack was first observed in 1994 and had only a limited amount 
of leakage.  During the first 21 years of service the crack was 
exposed to nitrate-rich liquid, while for the past 25 years it has 
been in the vapor space. Though the exact date is unknown, 
visual inspection results and the limited amount of leakage 
indicate that through-wall penetration occurred during the past 
25 years of vapor exposure.  However, initiation of the crack 
may have occurred during the exposure to liquid phase. 
 
 
Figure 5.  Stress corrosion crack near repair weld in tank. 
 
The crack is located near a repair weld in the middle 
horizontal weld. In 2007, it was determined that the length of 
the crack was approximately 19 inches.  The visible portion of 
the crack begins at the left edge of the repair weld and then arcs 
so that it becomes parallel to the horizontal weld.   According 
to the residual stress modeling, the maximum transverse tensile 
stress occurs at this location [3-5]. The distance of the parallel 
portion of the arc is approximately 6 inches from the center of 
the weld.  This distance is further than that observed for other 
cracks in the tank, however, the effect of a nearby vertical weld 
may influence the residual stress pattern as well.  The through 
wall portion of the crack is approximately 14.4 inches.  At each 
end of the through-wall section of the crack are part through-
wall sections (see Figure 5 for UT scan of crack).  In the plate 
above the weld, a primarily vertical branched crack extends 
tangentially from the repair weld approximately 3.7 inches 
above the middle horizontal weld.  Approximately 1 inch of 
this segment is through-wall, whereas in 2002, all of this 
segment was part through-wall.  There has been approximately 
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1.7 inches of crack extension into the base plate since 2002.  
The segment that has extended is part through-wall.  The part 
through-wall crack in the plate beneath the weld arcs back 
toward the middle horizontal weld. The arc-like pattern of the 
crack adjacent to the weld repair is consistent with laboratory 
results [6].  The behavior also agrees with the residual stress 
model for a narrow weld repair in that the crack is located a 
short distance from the weld repair fusion line [5]. 
 
Due to a lack of significant driving forces, either 
hydrostatic or residual stresses, the crack currently does not 
impact either the structural stability or the leak tightness of the 
tank.  This statement is confirmed by the finite element fracture 
analysis previously performed on the crack (assuming that it 
was 15 inches) [7].  The analysis showed that the hydrostatic 
stresses were not sufficient to drive the crack to instability.   
The horizontal orientation of the crack means that hydrostatic 
stresses in the hoop direction will not have a significant impact 
on further crack growth.  Therefore, from a structural stability 
perspective the crack is not anticipated to be significant to 
facility operations.   
 
Crack growth rates were estimated based on the change in 
length between the 2002 and the 2007 measurements divided 
by the time between the measurements.  The results of this 
calculation are shown in Table 1 for each of the growing 
cracks.  The first observation is that the crack growth rates are 
approximately 1 to 2 orders of magnitude lower than the crack 
growth rate observed in a 5 M nitrate solution on a laboratory 
sample at approximately the same temperature as the Tank 15 
wall [1].  The second observation is that the crack growth rate 
appears to decrease as the distance from the edge of the weld 
increases.  For example, for Crack #1 in 2002 the distance from 
the weld was 3.76 inches, whereas for Crack #3 the distance 
was 2.2 inches (Note: These are not the total crack length, but 
the length on one side of the weld).  The growth rate for Crack 
#3 appears to be approximately 4 times greater than Crack #1.  
Both of these observations suggest that the stress intensity at 
the crack tip is decreasing and approaching KIscc as the crack 
tip approaches the edge of the residual stress zone.  The 
observation that the cracks are only part through-wall at the end 
also suggests that the cracks are nearing the edge of the 
residual stress zone.   
Fitness-For-Service Evaluation of Flaws 
 
Crack specific evaluations were performed to determine 
the possibility of unstable crack growth. The Fitness-For-
Service fracture methodology outlined in API-579 (i.e., the 
Failure Assessment Diagram) was used for this evaluation [8].  
The analysis provided a critical crack length for a given stress 
level.  If the measured crack length is less than the critical 
crack length, the flaw will continue to propagate at a sub-
critical rate.  On the other hand, if the measured crack length is 
greater than the critical crack length uncontrolled, rapid crack 
growth would occur.   The stresses anticipated for waste 
removal conditions in Tank 15 were utilized.  These conditions 
would certainly bound the current stresses in the tank (i.e., no 
hydrostatic loads).  Crack lengths and locations from the UT 
inspection were utilized in the analysis. 
 
Table 1.  Crack growth rates estimated from UT 
measurements. 
 
Crack # 
Crack Growth 
Rate 
(inches/yr) 
Total length 
of crack 
from edge of 
the weld in 
2002 
(inches) 
Total Length 
of crack 
from edge of 
the weld in 
2007 
(inches) 
1 0.098 3.76 4.22 
2 0.054 3.84 4.1 
3 0.367 2.2 3.9 
4 0.381 1.5 3.2 
5 M Nitrate 
solution at 
50 °C 4.380  
  
 
 
The stresses considered in the analysis were: hydrostatic, 
residual, dead load, seismic and loads due to the operation of a 
submersible mixer pump.  The primary stresses, particularly 
outside the residual stress zone, will be hydrostatic.  The fill 
level and specific gravity of the waste determine the hydrostatic 
stress.  For the current conditions, the hydrostatic stresses are 
minimal since only small volume of dry solids is present in the 
tank.  
 
In the future, the solids layer will be removed from the 
tank for further processing and to facilitate tank closure.  For 
waste removal, water is added to slurry the solids layer for 
transfer.  The specific gravity of the solids slurry is dependent 
on the soluble salt and insoluble solids concentration of the 
sludge.  The most recent solids slurry operation produced a 
sludge slurry with a soluble salt concentration of approximately 
5 to 7 wt.% and a 14 wt.% insoluble solid concentration.  The 
resulting specific gravity of this slurry was 1.16.  For the 
analysis a bounding value of 1.2 was assumed for the SpG of 
the slurry.   
 
Each of the cracks that exhibited growth was evaluated 
against the critical crack length at that location and at the 
specific orientation of the crack (i.e., either horizontal or 
vertical).  It was assumed in the analysis that the cracks were 
completely through-wall.  For a horizontal crack, the worst 
case was the crack that measured 6.7 inches at the 128” 
elevation.  The critical flaw size at this elevation and in this 
orientation was > 200 inches, which means that a margin of 
greater than 30 exists on the measured crack length.  For the 
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worst case vertical cracks that exhibited growth (all at 
elevations greater than 128”), the critical crack length was 
greater than 50 inches.  The longest vertical crack was 
measured at 10.5 inches, which means that a margin of greater 
than 5 exists on the measured crack length. 
 
Since the cracks exhibited sub-critical growth, the growth 
rate for each crack was utilized to estimate the time to reach the 
critical crack length.  For the calculations it was assumed that 
the growth rate is constant, even at distances that are clearly 
outside the area affected by the residual stresses from the weld.  
For the worst case horizontal crack, the growth rate was 0.38 
inches/yr.  The crack exhibited growth on one side, therefore 
only extension on one side of the crack will be considered.  
Given a critical crack length of 200 inches and a current crack 
length of 6.7 inches the crack will grow to the critical flaw size 
in approximately 500 years.  Likewise, the growth rate for the 
worst case vertical crack was only 0.05 inches.  The crack 
exhibited growth on one side, therefore only extension on one 
side of the crack will be considered.  Given a critical crack 
length of 50 inches and a current crack length of 10.5 inches 
the crack will grow to the critical crack length in approximately 
800 years.   Therefore, these particular cracks do not represent 
a threat to the structural stability of the tank.  
 
A “worst” case situation was considered to bound 
conditions in this tank and other tanks of similar construction 
where cracks exist.  A vertical crack 10.5 inches long was 
located at the 30 inch elevation (i.e., the highest stress area) and 
it was assumed to grow at a rate of 0.38 inches per year.  These 
assumptions are extremely conservative since only cracks in 
the vapor space have been observed to grow and in most cases 
the 30 inch level in the other tanks are covered with salt or 
sludge The critical crack length under these conditions was 24 
inches.  The time to critical crack length in this instance is 
approximately 36 years.  Although the time to the critical crack 
length is shorter in this case, there would be plenty of time to 
either respond by re-inspecting the cracks or to complete waste 
removal in the tank.  It was recommended that re-inspection of 
the cracks that exhibited growth be performed again in 2014 
(i.e., 7 years after the most recent inspection) to confirm that 
crack growth is indeed dissipating. 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Ultrasonic inspection of radioactive high level waste tank 
was performed in 2007.  This was a re-inspection of the tank, 
the previous one was performed in 2002.  Ten cracks were 
characterized in the previous examination.  The re-inspection 
was performed to verify the present models and understanding 
for stress corrosion cracking. 
 
Each crack was evaluated for service exposure history, 
consistency of the crack behavior with the current 
understanding of stress corrosion cracking, and present and 
future impact to the structural integrity of the tank.  Crack 
instability calculations were performed on each crack for a 
bounding waste removal loading condition in Tank 15. 
 
In all cases, the crack behavior was determined to be 
consistent with the previous understanding of stress corrosion 
cracking in a waste tank environment.  The length of the cracks 
was limited due to the short-range nature of the residual 
stresses near seam, repair and attachment welds.  A comparison 
of  the 2002 UT results with the 2007 UT results indicated 
crack growth on four of the cracks in the vapor space.  
However, the growth remained within the residual stress zone. 
 
The impact of the cracks that grew on the future service of 
the tank was assessed by the Fitness-For-Service fracture 
methodology outlined in API-579.  A bounding loading 
condition for waste removal of the solids from this tank was 
considered for this analysis.  The analysis showed that the 
combination of hydrostatic, seismic, pump and weld residual 
stresses are not expected to drive any of the cracks identified 
during the UT inspection to instability.   
 
It was recommended that a third examination of selected 
cracks be performed in 2014.  This examination would provide 
information to determine whether any additional detectable 
degradation is occurring in the tank and to supplement the basis 
for characterization of conditions that are non-aggressive to 
tank corrosion damage.   
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